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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE fc)F PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1987). This actioji is a petition for 
review of the Order of the Industrial Commission regarding 
Appellant's (hereafter "Plaintiff's") application for benefits due 
under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, UTA|H CODE ANN. § 35-1-1, 
et seg. (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 0N APPEAL 
I. Whether Plaintiff is entitled | to receive temporary 
total disability benefits after reaching medical stabilization. 
II. Whether the Industrial Commission's determination 
of the extent of Plaintiff's permanent partial disability was made 
without the support of substantial evidence. 
III. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to a hearing 
regarding the medical panel's report when hei failed to request one 
or to raise the issue below. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-65 (1981), s^ t out in full in the 
Addendum. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-77 (1982), s£t out in full in the 
Addendum. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-82.51 (1965)|, set out in full in 
the Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is brpught on a petition for review of an Order 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Workers' Compensation 
Division. Plaintiff suffered an industrial accident on August 17, 
1983, while employed by Howard Foley Company. (R. 229-230). He 
suffered lacerations to the back of his head, injured his neck, 
and was bruised when the backhoe he was operating fell over and 
rolled down the slope on which he was working. (R. 230). On 
August 10, 1986, Plaintiff signed an application for hearing 
seeking a determination of continuing temporary total disability, 
a referral to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, and a 
determination of his permanent partial disability. (R. 6-7). A 
hearing was held on these issues on December 10, 1986. (R. 25-71). 
At that time, the medical evidence in the record at pages R. 
72-189 was admitted. After the hearing, the matter was referred 
to a medical panel, whose report is included in the record at R. 
207-218, 221-223. The medical panel considered all of the other 
medical evidence in the record, and the panel concluded that 
Plaintiff's condition had stabilized as of July 21, 1986, and that 
his total permanent impairment was 18.5% resulting from the 
industrial accident and 4.5% resulting from pre-existing 
impairment. (R. 212, 214-15). 
Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Medical Panel Report. 
(R. 224-227). In it, he objected to three things: the extent of 
the medical panel's rating for cervical spondolysis, the extent of 
the impairment rating for the right hand, and the determination 
that the hearing loss was entirely pre-existing. Most of the 
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Objection to the Medical Panel Report was directed to this third 
J 
point. The Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, dated May 29, 1987, and found that 
an industrial accident had indeed occurred and adopted the medical 
panel's findings as his own regarding the extent of Plaintiff's 
disability. The Judge also found that stabilization had occurred 
as of July 21, 1986. (R. 228-235). 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Review,! dated June 11, 1987. 
he determination of 
spine injury, 
determination of a 
(R. 236-38). In it, he again complained of tl 
permanent disability relating to the cervical) 
indirectly again raised his objection to the 
one percent (1%) impairment due to the injuryi to the right hand, 
and again raised his claim which was presented and rejected at the 
hearing that Plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability 
i 
payments until he could be retrained. Nowhere in the Motion for 
Review did Plaintiff argue that he was entit: 
regarding the medical panel's report, or in ^ny way request such a 
hearing. 
ed to a hearing 
The Industrial Commission issued an 
Plaintiff's Motion for Review on August 9, 1 
it, the Commission determined that the Admin 
acted correctly in using the date of stabili 
which temporary total compensation ends, andj 
medical panel's findings regarding the exteri 
disability. Plaintiff then filed a Petition for Review to this 
Court on August 27, 1987, alleging that Plaintiff "is entitled to 
Order denying 
|987. (R. 244-46). In 
istrative Law Judge 
zation as the date on 
in adopting the 
t of the Plaintiff's 
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a higher impairment rating for his cervical injuries based upon 
the weight of the credible evidence presented." He further 
alleges he is entitled to temporary total disability payments 
until he can be retrained. (R. 248-49). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff is not entitled to temporary total disability 
benefits after he reaches medical stabilization. Once an 
applicant recovers sufficiently to become medically stable, he or 
she is eligible for permanent disability benefits, but is no 
longer entitled to temporary total disability benefits. This case 
is controlled by Booms v. Rapp Construction Co., 720 P.2d 1363 
(Utah 1986), and its rule should not be altered. 
Plaintiff's permanent partial disability rating is a 
finding of fact by the Industrial Commission. Plaintiff fails to 
show how the Industrial Commission's decision was incorrect under 
the applicable standard of review. The Industrial Commission's 
determination was supported by substantial evidence, and should 
not be upset by this Court. 
Finally, Plaintiff has no right to a hearing he did not 
request. This issue was not raised below and should not properly 
be considered on appeal. Moreover, Plaintiff's failure to request 
a hearing waived any claim to such a hearing and precludes any 
error by the Industrial Commission on this issue. The statute 
permits such hearings but does not mandate them. The Industrial 
Commission did not wrongfully deny Plaintiff a hearing on the 
credibility of the medical evidence, he did not even request such 
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a hearing. The Industrial Commission's failure to act in such a 
situation cannot be considered error. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TpTAL BENEFITS PAST 
THE DATE OF MEDICAL STABILIZATION 
A. Utah Law Is Clear that Plaintiff Is Not Entitled 
to Temporary Benefits Once He Becomes Eligible 
for Permanent Benefits. 
Plaintiff's first claim of error is (that he is entitled 
to temporary total disability benefits until he is retrained, 
since he cannot return to his former employment and is unable to 
find employment. This claim was directly dea 
Supreme Court in Booms v. Rapp Construction go., 720 P.2d 1363 
It with by the Utah 
(Utah 1986). There the Court stated: 
The first issue raised on appeal is whether 
the Industrial Commission can terminate temporary 
total disability benefits after a finding of 
medical stabilization without making a finding 
that the worker is able to return to work. 
720 P.2d at 1365. The Court concluded that 'the Commission is not 
required to make findings of ability to work when, as in this 
case, it makes an award for permanent partial disability." Id., at 
1366, n. 2. That is exactly what occurred in this case. The 
Commission awarded the Plaintiff permanent partial disability 
benefits and he is seeking continued temporary total benefits 
after the date of medical stabilization because he claims that he 
is not able to work. Just as no finding of ability to work is 
necessary for the Commission to terminate temporary total 
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benefits, neither is the Commission required to determine that the 
applicant is adequately trained to return to work before ending 
temporary total benefits, at least if it awards permanent 
disability benefits. 
The Court in Booms stated that: 
(t)he purpose of those (temporary total 
disability) benefits is to "provide income for an 
employee during the time of recuperation from his 
injury and until his condition has stabilized." 
. . . Thus, temporary total disability benefits 
are to continue until the Commission determines 
that the disability fits into another disability 
classification or until benefits have been paid 
for the statutory maximum of 312 weeks. 
Id. at 1366 (quoting Entwistle Co. v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 at 497 
(Utah 1981)). In this case, the Commission properly determined 
that the Plaintiff fit into another disability classification, 
permanent partial disability, and terminated his temporary total 
benefits. 
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Booms' analysis of the 
structure of the Workers* Compensation Statute in Johnson v. 
Harsco/Heckett, 737 P.2d 986 (Utah 1987). The Court summarized 
that structure stating: 
Moreover, the result Plaintiff urges is 
inconsistent with the statutory structure which 
provides for both temporary and permanent 
benefits. In this regard, under Utah's workers' 
compensation statutes, there are four categories 
of disability, each controlled by a separate 
statutory provision. The common denominator for 
compensation under each category is the loss of 
employability resulting from the injury. 
Generally, temporary total disability benefits 
are awarded when an individual suffers a 
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job-related injury that prevents him 
returning to work. These benefits continue until 
the Commission determines that the d 
fits into another classification or 
have been paid for the statutory min 
weeks. Determination of the tempora 
permanent nature of a disability is 
made when the claimant reaches medic 
zation. Once stabilization has occu 
claimant moves from temporary to permanent 
status, "he is no longer eligible fo 
benefits." Therefore to award Plain 
or her from 
isability 
until benefits 
imum of 312 
ry or 
typically 
al stabili-
rred and the 
r temporary 
tiff tempor-
ary total disability compensation regardless of 
the permanent nature of his impairment contra-
venes the statutory structure which provides for 
both temporary and permanent benefits. 
have been given, 
737 P.2d at 988 (footnotes omitted, quoting flooms, 720 P.2d at 
1366). Plaintiff does not dispute that he h^s reached medical 
stabilization, neither does he claim that thef permanent partial 
disability award was improper and should not 
Instead, he claims that he should not only receive on-going 
temporary total disability benefits, but that his permanent 
partial disability benefits should be increased. The Industrial 
Commission acted properly in finding that Plaintiff had reached 
medical stabilization and in awarding permanent benefits. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to continue to receive temporary 
benefits after he has been transferred to permanent status. 
Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for additional temporary total 
benefits must fail. 
It should also be pointed out that |Ln this case, 
Plaintiff is not being penalized for not requesting permanent 
total disability benefits as intimated in Plaintiffs Brief. He 
is not eligible for such benefits. A consideration of the 
-7-
relevant factors in determining permanent total disability shows 
that Plaintiff fails to meet the standard. He is too little 
disabled for his age and education level to be permanently totally 
disabled. Instead, he was awarded permanent partial disability by 
the Commission. Plaintiff did not allege below and does not claim 
on appeal that he is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits. 
B. Other Authorities Agree with Utah's Analysis. 
The leading authority in the workers* compensation field 
agrees with the Utah Supreme Court's analysis. Professor Larson 
discusses the four-way classification of disabilities which Utah 
and many other states employ, and states that with regard to 
temporary total disability awards, 
The commonest question is: when does the 
"healing period" end and "stabilization" occur? 
The answer to this question determines in most 
states when temporary benefits cease and when the 
extent of permanent disability can be appraised, 
for purposes of making either a permanent partial 
or a permanent total award. 
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 57.12(b) (1983). 
He goes on to state that "the issue may be a purely medical one." 
Id. , § 57.12(c). That is clearly the case in Utah under Booms, 
which states that "identifying when the healing period has ended 
does not require a finding of ability to work; stabilization is 
strictly a medical question." 720 P.2d at 1367. 
Professor Larson also addressed the problem Plaintiff 
complains of in this case—where stabilization occurs but the 
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claimant is unable to return to work. After briticizing a 
statutorily compelled result in Minnesota that a claimant is 
entitled to get temporary total benefits until! 
states: 
1 he finds work, he 
Once the physical condition is stabi 
question becomes: is the inability 
the result of the injury? If it is, 
straightforward approach would then 
the claimant permanently disabled byj 
impairment. If later the claimant g 
employment, the case can be reopened 
meantime, the claimant is definitely! 
the compensation sense, because his 
impairment causes his unemployment; 
same time the disability cannot accii 
characterized as temporary, since it 
stable and what remains is permanent 
process of elimination, one comes to 
permanent award, subject of course t 
lized, the 
to get work 
the 
be to find 
his residual 
ets steady 
In the 
disabled in 
physical 
but at the 
rately be 
has become 
By the 
a total 
o reopening. 
Id. § 57.12(d). It is clear that Professor Larson would not agree 
with Plaintiff's attempt to obtain continued temporary benefits 
after medical stabilization in a state with both temporary and 
permanent benefits. 
C. Plaintiff Fails To Show Contrary Ut$h Authority 
Or To Disinguish Controlling Utah Decisions. 
The cases cited in Plaintiff's brief are not helpful in 
determining the issue before the Court and tljieir selection 
evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of Utah's statutory 
structure which provides for both temporary and permanent 
benefits. Plaintiff argues that since he is unable to return to 
his former occupation, he is entitled under J^tah law to temporary 
total benefits. As support for this proposition, he cites a 
number of Utah cases, every one of which deals with permanent 
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total disability, not temporary total disability. The standard of 
total disability discussed in the cases Plaintiff cites is for an 
award of permanent total disability. It is not applicable in 
cases of temporary total disability, due to the different 
standards used and purposes served by the categories. Booms and 
Johnson, supra, are controlling law as to when temporary total 
disability benefits terminate, and they do not permit the award of 
additional temporary benefits of any kind to Plaintiff in this 
case since he has been transferred to permanent status. 
Plaintiff also asserts that under Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977), a claimant is 
entitled to temporary total benefits "until he is able to return 
to work." 562 P.2d at 620. This is not controlling law in Utah. 
Neither Booms (Utah 1986) nor Johnson (Utah 1987) can be read to 
support the claim that an applicant is entitled to receive 
temporary total benefits after he or she is moved to permanent 
status, regardless of ability to work. Booms expressly rejected 
the argument that a claimant must be able to work before temporary 
total benefits cease. Therefore, the dicta in Ortega relied on by 
Plaintiff has been implicitly overruled by more recent cases and 
is of no weight. 
Plaintiff asserts that he is unable to work. If that is 
true and he is not able to be retrained for any other job, then he 
might become eligible for permanent total disability benefits. 
The Industrial Commission retains jurisdiction over all its cases 
and could impose such additional liability on the employer if the 
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spirit and structure 
ectly contradict the 
circumstances warrant. If Plaintiff does turn out to be 
permanently totally disabled, he will get his compensation. If he 
does not, then he is not entitled to more than the temporary total 
disability benefits received during his period of healing and the 
permanent partial disability compensation he was awarded as a 
result of the permanent impairment he suffered from the accident. 
To permit Plaintiff to receive additional temporary total 
disability benefits would violate the letter, 
of the workers' compensation statute, and dirj 
Supreme Court's opinion in Booms. 
Plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish Booms, except 
to refer to "the statute and case law . . . interpreting the 
Worker's [sic] Compensation Act." Appellantjs Brief, p.10. As 
discussed above, the structure of the Act requires that no 
temporary benefits be awarded once the claimant reaches permanent 
status, and the only Utah case law Plaintiff 
involving permanent total disability awards, jwhich is not an issue 
in this case. There is no authority under Utah law to permit a 
claimant to continue to receive temporary total benefits because 
he is unable to return to work once he reaches medical 
stabilization and is awarded permanent benef 
ANN. § 35-1-66 or 35-1-67. Booms is control 
Plaintiff's first claim of error should be dismissed, affirming 
the Order of the Industrial Commission. 
refers to are cases 
its under UTAH CODE 
ling in this area, and 
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II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING AS TO THE EXTENT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND MAY NOT BE DISPLACED. 
Plaintiff's second point on appeal is that he is entitled 
to a higher impairment rating for his permanent partial disability. 
It is well established that such a rating is a question of fact. 
Entwistle Company v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495, at 498 (Utah 1981) 
("The extent and duration of an employee's disability are 
questions of fact to be determined by the Commission."). While 
Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt a different impairment rating, 
it is clearly improper for this Court to make findings of fact. 
Instead, its function is to determine if the Commission acted 
properly in coming to its conclusions, and if not, to remand for 
further action. The standard of review of the Industrial 
Commission's findings of fact is not, as Plaintiff's brief 
discusses, whether they are supported by the most "credible" 
evidence, but rather whether there is "substantial evidence" to 
support the facts as found by the Commission. As stated in 
Entwistle, 
We review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commission's findings, and when 
there is substantial evidence to support the 
facts as found by the Commission, its order will 
not be disturbed. 
626 P.2d at 498. 
In this case, it is clear that there is substantial 
evidence to support the Commission's findings as to the extent of 
Plaintiff's impairment. The Commission adopted the determination 
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of the medical panel, which was in turn subst 
total amount of impairment as determined by D 
The Utah Supreme Court recently deal 
case in Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 10 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted ce| 
and temporary total disability benefits, but 
additional temporary total benefits and permd 
bntially the same 
r. Orme. 
t with a very similar 
9 (Utah 1986). There 
rtain medical benefits 
denied claims for 
nent partial 
benefits. The Court affirmed this determination and stated 
. . . this Court will not disturb the findings 
and orders of the Commission unless they are 
arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitary 
and capricious when they are contrary to the 
evidence or without any reasonable oasis in the 
evidence. Plaintiff argues, in essence, that the 
findings in this case are arbitraryiand 
capricious because the administrative law judge 
adopted the findings of the medical panel rather 
than those of Dr. Kimball, the treating physician. 
732 P.2d at 111 (citations omitted). After refusing to rule that 
a treating physician's findings should be given preference as a 
matter of law, the Court went on to find that the Commission's 
adoption of the medical panel's report was not arbitrary and 
capricious because it was supported by substantial evidence. 
In this case, Plaintiff is, in essence, arguing that the 
Commission's findings were arbitrary and cap 
administrative law judge adopted the finding 
rather than those of Dr. Orme, the independent medical examiner. 
In this case, just as in Rushton, the medical 
ricious because the 
s of the medical panel 
1 panel's report was 
based on "not only its examination of and interview with 
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Plaintiff, but also on the reports, test results, and x-rays from 
the previous examinations of Plaintiff's treating physicians," 732 
P.2d at 112, as well as of the independent medical examiners. The 
medical panel report (R. 207-218) refers to the reports of both 
Dr. Baer and Dr. Orme, which are relied on by Plaintiff, as well 
as the many other doctors who had seen Plaintiff. 
The medical panel report drew approximately the same 
overall conclusion regarding the total extent of Plaintiff's 
permanent disability and the amount attributable to the industrial 
accident as Dr. Orme, but divided the amount of impairment attri-
butable to the various causes in a different manner. As the 
Industrial Commission stated in it's Order Denying Motion for 
Review, 
It is clear that, prior to hearing, there existed 
considerable medical controversy regarding the 
Plaintiff's overall permanent partial impairment. 
It is the resolution of exactly this kind of 
medical controversy that causes the need for 
medical panels. The Commission considers it 
entirely proper for the Administrative Law Judge 
to rely on the medical panel findings absent some 
good reason to believe the medical panel did not 
thoroughly or impartially review the matter. In 
this case, counsel for the applicant fails to 
point out bias on the part of the medical panel 
or their failure to consider all the evidence. 
He simply states that the medical panel's rating 
differs with that of two other doctors. The 
Commission finds this is insufficient to suport 
the contention that the Administrative Law Judge 
erred in relying on the medical panel findings. 
(R. 245-246). The Defendant Employer and Insurer submit that the 
Industrial Commission was correct, and that there is no reason to 
upset the factual determination of the Commission. 
-14-
all his medical 
of Plaintiff's 
Plaintiffs complaint is basically that he was not 
awarded enough permanent partial disability for his back 
problems. The medical panel was chaired by Dr. Moress, a 
neurologist/ and included Dr. Holbrook, an orthopedic surgeon. 
They interviewed Plaintiff and had access to 
records. Their opinion regarding the extent 
permanent disability due to his back problem^ is well-founded and 
credible. There is no indication that the pinel failed to 
consider any of the medical evidence, and Plaintiff did not 
present any additional medical evidence after the panel's report 
or claim that the panel was in any way biased. There is no reason 
for this Court to determine that the Commission's conclusion 
regarding the extent of Plaintiffs permanent partial disability 
is not supported by substantial evidence is therefore proper. The 
Industrial Commission's determination of Plaintiffs permanent 
partial disability should be affirmed. 
III. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANOTHER HEARING IN THIS CASE, 
A. Plaintiff Failed to Raise This Issue Below and Cannot 
Raise for the First Time on Appeal. 
Plaintiff also argues that in the efvent the Court does 
not overstep its function and make new findi 
requests, he should be given a hearing regar 
of the medical evidence. Plaintiff did not 
in his Objection to the Medical Panel's Repo| 
did not submit any other request, either wri 
|ngs of fact, as he 
ding the credibility 
request such a hearing 
rt (R. 224-227), and 
tten or oral, for such 
a hearing to the ALJ. Moreover, he did not raise the issue 
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in his Motion for Review to the Industrial Commission (R. 236-238). 
Plaintiff even fails to raise it in the Petition for Review filed 
with this Court, dated August 27, 1987 (R. 248-249). The first 
time the issue appears is in the Docketing Statement he filed with 
this Court, dated September 16, 1987 (R. 251-253). 
Utah law is well established that a party may not raise 
an issue on appeal which was not presented for decision to the 
trial court below. See, e.g., Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 
1986); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1983). While no Utah cases have been found on this 
issue in the context of review of an administrative agency's 
decision, the same principle should apply. 
Professor Larson agrees with this proposition, stating: 
. . . when the rule whose relaxation is in 
question is more than a merely formal requirement 
and touches substantial rights of fair play, the 
relaxation is no more justified on a compensation 
appeal than on any other. Such a rule is that 
forbidding the raising on appeal of an issue that 
has not been raised below or the revieval of an 
issue that has been conceded, abandoned, or 
otherwise resolved. 
3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 77A.83 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). 
Other states have also reached this conclusion. In Lewis 
v. Anaconda Company, 168 Mont. 463, 543 P.2d 1339 (1975), the 
Montana Supreme Court noted in a footnote that the claimant could 
not raise a constitutional question of due process for the first 
time on appeal, and therefore did not consider it. Similarly, in 
Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 4 0 Pa. Commw. 117, 
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396 A.2d 905 (1979), the court stated that thb claimant could not 
complain of the referee's actions if he had not raised the issue 
to the Board. 
Since Plaintiff failed to raise any ^laim of entitlement 
to a second hearing to either the ALJ or the Commission, they did 
not have an opportunity to rule on the issue, and Plaintiff should 
be precluded from raising it now on appeal. 
B. Such a Hearing Is Permissive, Not Ma ndatory, and the 
ALJ's Failure to Order Such a Hearing Without a Request 
from any Party Cannot Be Error. 
Even if the Court were to permit Pla intiff to raise this 
issue for the first time in this appeal, there is no basis for 
remand. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-77 (1982) states in pertinent part 
that if objections are filed to a medical panel's report, Mthe 
commission may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and 
issues involved. . . ." It is clear that a Rearing after the 
medical panel submits its report is, under the 1982 amendment, not 
mandatory, but within the discretion of the ALJ. See, e.g. , Moore 
v. American Coal Company, 737 P.2d 989 (Utah 1987) . Therefore, 
mere failure to have a hearing which is not Mandated cannot be 
error. If Plaintiff had requested a hearing 
would at least arguably have a claim that th^ ALJ had abused his 
discretion in refusing to grant the hearing.| In this case, 
however, there was no request for a second hearing to inquire into 
the credibility of the medical panel's report, and the Court 
cannot decide as a matter of law that the failure to provide a 
and been refused, he 
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hearing is error when the legislature left that decision to the 
discretion of the ALJ. 
Plaintiff relies on UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-82.51 (1965), 
which protects the parties' right to cross-examine. There was no 
denial of that right in this case. Plaintiff did not request any 
opportunity to cross-examine the members of the medical panel, as 
§ 35-1-77 expressly provides, and cannot claim that his failure to 
so request entitles him to a remand. This case is analogous to a 
case where an attorney fails to cross-examine at the hearing and 
then attempts to complain on appeal that he was denied the 
opportunity to cross-examination when in fact he did not take his 
chance. Plaintiff has waived any right to complain of the lack of 
a second hearing in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no dispute that Plaintiff's healing period ended 
and that he had reached medical stabilization by, at the latest, 
July 21, 1986. The Booms case holds that eligibility for 
temporary benefits ends upon stabilization and that no 
determination of ability to work need be made. It controls this 
action and requires that the Commission's decision be affirmed as 
to Plaintiff's first point, and that no additional temporary total 
disability benefits be awarded during Plaintiff's rehabilitation. 
Plaintiff also claims that he is entitled to a higher 
permanent partial disability rating. This determination of fact 
by the Commission is based on substantial, credible evidence and 
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may not be disturbed on appeal. Finally, Plaintiff claims that he 
is entitled to a second hearing to investigate the credibility of 
the medical panel's report, despite the fact that he never 
requested such a hearing. That failure waives any claim of error 
Plaintiff could have regarding this point. Moreover, Plaintiff 
failed to raise this issue below, or even in his Petition for 
Review, and is precluded from asserting it noW on appeal. 
Therefore, Plaintiff's appeal is without merit, and the Order of 
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of January, 1988|. 
RAY, QUINNEY| & NEBEKER 
(C^'7y^)J? V ^ ^ * ^ 
Steven J. Ae 
Attorneys fcj 
and the TiJ 
schbacher 
r Howard Foley Company 
avelers Insurance 
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